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As United States Department of Agriculture (USDA)
Secretary Dan Glickman predicted, food and agriculture issues
were a challenging and acrimonious item on the agenda at the
World Trade Organization (WTO) Ministerial Meeting in
Seattle. In a speech to the Center for Strategic and
International Studies, Glickman argued that the intensity and
sensitivity of agricultural issues is greater than in the past and
that agricultural issues would be the dominant and most
difficult issue in the Seattle Ministerial.1  US Trade
Representative Charlene Barshefsky certainly supported this
view, asserting before Congress that agriculture would be at the
"heart" of the US agenda for future world trade talks.2
For anyone who followed the previous Uruguay Round of
world trade negotiations, these comments might seem familiar.
Contentious debate over agriculture trade rules is nothing new.
From the very beginnings of the WTO's predecessor, the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), 3 agriculture has been
a central and contentious issue. From the founding meeting in
Havana in 1947 to the recently completed Uruguay Round, 4 food
and agriculture issues have repeatedly disrupted the entire
trade negotiation process. 5
1. Agriculture Secretary Dan Glickman, Speech to the Center for
Strategic and International Studies (June 16, 1999).
2. See U.S., Japan To Present Tariff Proposals For New WTO
Negotiations, INSIDE U.S. TRADE, July 2, 1999.
3. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, opened for signature October
30, 1947, 61 U.S.T. A3, 55 U.N.T.S. 187 [hereinafter "GATT"].
4. Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Trade
Negotiations, December 15, 1994, 33 I.L.M. 1 [hereinafter "WTO"].
5. For a closer look at the agriculture debates at the founding meeting see
Burt Henningson, United States Agricultural Trade and Development Policy
During World War II: The Role of the Office of Foreign Agricultural Relations
(1981) (Ph.D. Dissertation, University of Arkansas (Fayetteville)). For a look at
the same theme in the most recent round, see Farms Talk May Kill GATT,
CHRISTIAN ScI. MONITOR, September 4, 1988.
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As a result, agricultural trade negotiations often give rise to
poorly considered and unworkable outcomes. The final language
in the Uruguay Round Agreement on Agriculture6 (AoA) was
cobbled together at the last minute, papering over differences in
order to permit the conclusion of the negotiations on tariffs,
banking, textiles, and many other important sectors of the
economy. In recognition of the unsatisfactory nature of the AoA,
it was agreed that this would only be a temporary measure, 7
with commitments to begin new negotiations by the year 2000.
These agriculture talks have, in effect, already begun and are
considered to be part of what is called the "built-in" agenda of
the World Trade Organization. Negotiators know that they
have to tackle this issue whether or not there is an agreement to
begin a comprehensive new round of negotiations.8
One outcome of the last round of talks is that despite the
signing of a "peace clause"9 designed to keep agricultural trade
disputes to a minimum, there are more agriculture- and food-
related trade disputes in the WTO than ever before. The US
alone has recently filed 12 complaints in the WTO on agriculture
issues, far exceeding the previous record. 10 One reason for the
proliferation of disputes is that many of the new rules call for
such dramatic changes that countries have been unable or
reluctant to implement them. Chile, Hungary and the
Philippines, for examples, have announced that they will not be
implementing certain rules and have asked the rest of the WTO
members for formal exemptions.
The Chilean government, one of the most fervent
proponents of radical liberalization in the Uruguay Round, is
now arguing that they cannot live up to some of their WTO
commitments because world commodity prices have fallen
instead of risen as they had hoped. Chilean officials are saying
6. Agreement on Agriculture, Final Act Embodying the Results of the
Uruguay Round of Trade Negotiations, signed at Marrakesh, April 15, 1994, 33.
I.L.M. 1125 [hereinafter "AoA"I.
7. See Agreement on Agriculture, art. l(f).
8. A number of nations are calling for the launching of a new round of
comprehensive talks at the upcoming ministerial meeting schedule for
November 30 through December 2, 1999 in Seattle, Washington. If a new
round is created, then these mandated agriculture talks would be folded into
the larger discussion. For preparatory documents submitted for the
ministerial, see <http://www.wto.orglwto/minist/seatdocs.htm>.
9. See Agreement on Agriculture, art. 13.
10. See Ambassador Peter Scher, Testimony before the Senate Banking
and Finance and Urban Affairs Committee, Subcommittee on International
Trade and Finance (May 4, 1999).
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that living up to current WTO obligations would destroy much of
their agricultural economy, so they are begging for a waiver that
would permit them to change or abandon their previous
commitments. The director of the Chilean Ministry of
Agriculture's international department, Sergio Ramos, has said
that world "markets have been so sporadic and have gone down
quickly that our price band mechanism has been unable to
cope.""
Only a handful of countries have asked for formal
permission to abandon or postpone commitments made in the
agriculture agreement, but many others are also finding it
difficult to comply-primarily due to the general collapse of
international commodity prices since the end of the Uruguay
Round. According to the Economist, commodity prices are lower
than at any point in the 150 years they have been keeping
records. 12 Countries totally dependent on commodity exports
have much lower export revenues, which leads to a reduction in
the food commodity imports that they are able to pay for,
affecting their food security and further diminishing the global
market, thus pushing global food prices down even lower.' 3
With crop and livestock prices at historic lows around the
planet, many countries, including the US, are overtly or covertly
abandoning their WTO commitments. In the United States this
year, family farmers are facing a crisis much like that of the
mid-1980s due to exceptionally low farmgate prices. Since the
signing of the WTO agreement in December of 1994, farm prices
for most of the major commodities have fallen 30 percent or
more and agricultural bankers in the heart of family farm
country see grim times for at least the next few years.' 4 In
response to this crisis, the US government has abandoned a
number of the commitments made during the Uruguay Round
agriculture talks, including promises to reduce government
11. Chile to Seek Waiver From WTO For Wider Agriculture Price Band, 16
INT'L TRADE REP. 936 (1999).
12. A Raw Deal for Commodities, ECONOMIST, April 17, 1999, at 75.
13. See Some considerations concerning the availability of adequate
supplies of basic foodstuffs from external sources to LDCs and NFIDCs,
Contribution from the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development
to the World Trade Organization Committee on Agriculture (November 17-18,
1998).
14. Federal Reserve: Farmers Face Frim Financial Outlook, AGRI NEWS,
July 1, 1999, at Al.
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subsidies, to refrain from imposing import controls, and to cut
export subsidies. 15
Perhaps most shocking is that U.S. farm subsidies have
continued to rise, not fall, as had been promised by AoA
proponents. USDA Secretary Dan Glickman predicted 1999
would be "the highest year on record in terms of direct payments
to farmers by the government-$15.3 billion,"16 nearly 50
percent above US government direct payments to farmers at the
height of the Uruguay Round. In 1990, for example, direct
payments were around $9 billion.17 The US has also been
imposing import controls in hopes of boosting prices for US
farmers, including new restrictions on wheat gluten from
Europe' s and lamb from New Zealand.' 9
The most important deviation from the AoA commitments is
in the area of export dumping, or exporting goods at prices below
their cost of production. The federal government, through a
complex system of loan guarantees, deliberately sets domestic
farmgate prices at far below the cost of production for many
commodities. Due to its large share of the global market, U.S.
prices for commodities tied to government loan rates have
historically set the global market price for these commodities, as
traders and processors jockey for supplies. Under the U.S.
system, the government takes grain as collateral for farmer
loans that are set at below the cost of production. It then
releases the collateralized grain to the domestic market at those
low prices. Theoretically, the loan rate would establish the floor
price, but recent events have caused prices to drop below the
already low loan rates. As farmers struggle to stay in business
they produce more commodities to maintain their net income
and debt payments, adding to surpluses that further depress
market prices. Increasing domestic supplies have caused the US
government to double the amount of export subsidies it gives to
companies to clear domestic markets while also increasing
15. See Glickman Rejects Criticism of U.S. Farm Aid as Trade
Protectionism, INSIDE U.S. TRADE, Jan. 29, 1999, at 14.
16. A Biotech Warrior Stresses Subtlety, ST. Louis POST-DISPATCH, June 6,
1999, at A7.
17. Agriculture Payments: Numbers of Individuals Receiving 1990
Deficiency Payments and the Amounts, United States General Accounting
Office, 1992.
18. See U.S. Faces Two New WTO Panels on Wheat Gluten and 1916 AD
Act, INSIDE U.S. TRADE, July 30, 1999.
19. See Australia, New Zealand Fight U.S. Safeguards on Lamb in WTO,
INSIDE U.S. TRADE, August 6, 1999.
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export dumping via so-called "food aid."20 In the next year, the
Clinton Administration is looking to use $5.5 billion in export
credits, an increase of more than 50 percent, and to increase food
aid shipments to more than 10 million tons, compared to the
normal average of 3 million tons.
Notwithstanding the impassioned rhetoric of those who
proclaimed that the Uruguay Round would mark the end for
trade distorting farm programs, protectionist import barriers
and predatory export dumping, there is a long way to go to reach
those goals. Indeed, current price and policy trends suggest that
the chasm between reality and the purported free trade ideals
may get larger.
Under pressure from Congress to classify U.S. farm
subsidies as emergency aid to exempt them from mandatory
WTO notification requirements, Secretary Glickman has stated
that he may not even formally report these payments to the
WTO. 2 1 Farmers in Florida are asking the government to
impose new import controls on a number of fresh fruits and
vegetables in response to currency devaluations that they
believe are being used to avoid tariffs. They argue that Mexico
can simply devalue the peso by the same percentage as the
tariff, nullifying the effect of the tariff in terms of net cost to US
buyers, a move devastating to Florida producers. 22 On the
export dumping issue, the head of the USDA Agricultural
Marketing Service, Tim Galvin, shocked analysts when he
proposed that in order to raise prices for US soybean farmers,
the US government should buy and give away a major portion of
next year's soybean crop. 23
It comes as no surprise that the current agriculture trade
rules are being abandoned or ignored since they were poorly
constructed, internally contradictory, and slated for re-
negotiations from the very beginning. While there is
widespread dissatisfaction with the current WTO agriculture
rules, analysis of what is wrong and how to fix it remains wildly
divergent.
20. See Ian Elliot, French, Australian Officials want US Credits, Aid on
Table, FEEDSTUFFS, June 28, 1999, at 2.
21. See Text: Combest Letter to Glickman on AMTA, INSIDE U.S. TRADE,
July 2, 1999.
22. See Kevin Hall, Sector Wants Tariff Cuts Linked to Devaluations, J. OF
COMMERCE, June 10, 1999, at 5; and Tracy Rosselle, Top Ag Official Meet in
Florida to Hear Complaints, THE PACKER, June 14, 1999.
23. Soybean Buy Called Alternative To Subsidy, OMAHA WORLD-HERALD,
March 17, 1999.
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For example, some believe that current rules don not go far
enough in opening other markets to US agriculture and that this
is the cause of current low prices in the United States.24 Others
argue that the Uruguay Round opened US markets to far too
great a level of imports, resulting in competitive crops being
dumped into the U.S. market and a resulting plunge in domestic
farm prices. 25 Others argue that the AoA failed to adequately
address major trade distorting practices, like production
subsidies and export dumping, resulting in a global market that
is more chaotic than ever before. Although there are bitter
disagreements over how to fix current agriculture trade rules,
nearly everyone concurs that they must be either reformed or
abandoned.
This article will not attempt to explain or describe the
details of the agriculture agreement signed at Marrakesh. There
are many excellent descriptive articles that have been published
in this journal and in countless other places. 26 Likewise, this
article will not attempt to predict the future impacts of the
current AoA. Far too much time has been spent arguing over
the predictions of computer models, none of which have come
close to reality. We have chosen to focus this article on one
impact of current WTO rules of agricultural trade-the increase
in export dumping by grain corporations based in the United
States and on the impact of this dumping on two pubic policy
concerns: sustainable agriculture and the human right to food
security. The first section will look at the link between the
current WTO agriculture trade rules and the increase in export
dumping. Second, we will look at the impact of this dumping on
efforts by farmers to move toward more sustainable farming
practices. The third section will look at the impact of this
dumping on food security in terms of the right to food in the
24. See Dan Glickman, "U.S. Approach to Agriculture in A New Round,"
Remarks to XIX Meeting of the Cairns Group (August, 28, 1999); and Dennis
Avery, Asian Recovery Won't Help US Farmers, J. OF COM., June 4, 1999, at 7.
25. See Leland Swenson, Statement Before US House of Representatives
Committee on Agriculture, June 23, 1999; and Trade Policy Should Help, Not
Hurt Farmers, MILK MATTERS, FAMILY DAIRIES U.S.A., June 15, 1999, at 1.
26. See Jeffrey J. Steinle, Note, The Problem Child of World Trade: Reform
School for Agriculture, 4 MINN. J. GLOBAL TRADE 333 (1995); Tim Josling,
"Reform of World Agricultural Trade: The Uruguay Round Outcome," Paper for
Seminar on the WTO Agricultural Negotiations: the Lead up to Seattle (April
30, 1999); Focus on the WTO: Into the Future: (Part I) Getting Ready for WTO
Agricultural Negotiations, 5 UNION FARMER Q. 12 (1999); and Sophia Murphy,
"Trade and Food Security: An Assessment of the Uruguay Round Agreement on
Agriculture," 1999.
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United Nation's Universal Declaration of Human Rights.27 The
fourth section will look at how we might use upcoming WTO
Ministerial to make positive changes in current WTO
agriculture trade rules in regards to our two main themes,
sustainable farming and food security. This section will look at
the global political context for the Ministerial, and how that
might affect both the official agriculture negotiations and citizen
efforts to win reforms. The fifth and final section, details a set of
recommendations for the kinds of changes in WTO rules that
would help to encourage instead of discourage sustainable
farming and food security.
I. WTO AGRICULTURAL TRADE RULES: ENHANCING
TRADE VOLUMES THROUGH
EXPORT DUMPING
The US and the European Union (EU) dominated the Uru-
guay Round of multilateral trade negotiations. They used this
control to craft agricultural trade rules with their main objective
being an increase in the volume of trade in food and fiber prod-
ucts by the major companies that were based inside their territo-
ries, many of which enjoy dominant positions globally.28 US and
EU negotiators made three important changes in WTO agricul-
tural trade rules that served to promote this narrow interest.
First, these trading companies found ways to lower the
prices paid to farmers. The strength of family farm lobbies in
both the US and in Europe had been strong enough in the past
to win government support for setting the loan rate and, hence,
domestic farm prices high enough to permit most farmers to stay
in business most of the time. Supplemental payments are only
needed from the government in particularly lean years. As long
as internal prices were kept above world market prices there
would be fewer imports and fewer exports. Domestically pro-
duced crops, from both the United States and Europe, were more
expensive on world markets and therefore less competitive than
crops from Thailand or Argentina. To accomplish the corporate
27. United Nations Declaration of Human Rights, Art. 25.1, United
Nations General Assembly, 3rd Sess., G.A. Res. 217A, U.N. Doc. A/810 (1948).
28. The top 5 international agribusiness corporations by 1998 revenues are
U.S.-based Philip Morris ($57.8 billion), U.S.-based Cargill ($51.4 billion), Swit-
zerland-based Nestle ($49.5 billion), U.K./Netherlands-based Unilever ($44.9
billion) and U.S.-based Procter & Gamble ($37.6 billion) according to data com-
piled by A.V. Krebs, Director of the Corporate Agribusiness Research Project.
See The Forbes 500 Annual Directory; The Forbes Top 500 Private Corpora-
tions;, and Forbes International 500 Companies (1999).
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goal of lowering crop prices, new agriculture trade rules were
developed requiring countries to bring domestic prices down to
the lower world prices.29
Second, they did everything possible to reduce government
subsidies, 30 including those that helped keep a number of small
and medium-sized farmers in business. Many farmers around
the planet are supported in various ways that make it possible
for them to continue producing for local markets, effectively
shutting out import foods. New rules were drawn up to reduce
subsidies to domestic producers in hopes that these reductions
would push a number of farmers out of business and off their
farms; their production would then be replaced by imported
foods. In the context of a global market, this would mean, for
example, more corn from the US going into Brazil and more
sugar from Brazil coming into the United States.
Third, US and EU negotiators worked hard to remove as
many economic barriers31 (import tariffs, export levies, etc.) and
non-economic barriers (such as health and safety regulations 32)
to trade. Their objection was that these barriers to imports and
exports tended to raise the short-term price of internationally
traded goods, potentially making them less price competitive
than locally produced goods. Again, the basic objective is to in-
crease the volume of imports and exports.
At the same time, agribusiness lobbyists were working over-
time to protect their clients' right to use government funds for
export subsidies and credits. In this endeavor, they were also
largely successful. While the Uruguay Round did result in some
reduction in export subsidy expenditures,33 a number of the
most important export subsidy programs, such as credit guaran-
tees, were left untouched.34
US and EU negotiators successfully walked the tightrope of
protecting export subsidies while cutting government support in
other areas. The end result has been more or less as expected:
increased volumes of production to try to make up in volume
traded what was lost to lower prices and less government sup-
29. See Agreement on Agriculture, art. 6.1.
30. See Agreement on Agriculture, arts. 6, 7.
31. See Agreement on Agriculture, art. 4.
32. See Agreement on Agriculture, art. 14.
33. See Agreement on Agriculture, arts. 8, 9, 10, 11, 12.
34. The US government is gearing up to keep these kinds of export subsi-
dies off the negotiating table in the future. See US to Resist Efforts to Classify
Agricultural Credit Guarantees as Subsidies, BNA DAILY REPORT TO ExEcu-
TWIVES, June 28, 1999.
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port - and thus increased export dumping. In spite of waves of
financial and economic instability since the signing of the WTO
agreement in Marrakesh, import and export volumes flowing
through Europe and the United States have risen due to lower
prices and payments and to the reduction in regulatory controls
on trade. In the United States, for example, exports of our two
largest crops, corn and soybeans, have risen in spite of global
economic difficulties. Before the signing of the Marrakesh Agree-
ment (1993-94 market year) US corn exports were 1.328 million
bushels compared to 1.504 million bushels during the 1997-98
marketing year - an increase of over 10 percent. For soybeans,
US exports before Marrakesh were 589 million bushels com-
pared to 870 million last year.35
II. TRADE VOLUMES RISE ALONG WITH
EXPORT DUMPING
This increase in the volume of US grain and oilseed exports
in the face of global economic difficulty is due in part to an in-
crease in export dumping by the United States. This increase in
dumping is due largely to three factors: (1) the setting of farm
prices by the federal government at artificially and unrealisti-
cally low levels; (2) rising costs of production, causing an even
greater gap between falling export prices and rising costs of pro-
duction; and (3) the expansion of direct and indirect export sub-
sidies. All three of these factors are closely linked to the
implementation of current WTO rules, as discussed below.
In the US, the AoA was the guidebook for the re-writing the
commodity sections of new federal farm legislation. This new
law, ironically called the "Freedom to Farm" bill, was designed
to meet WTO agreements calling for lower US farm prices, re-
sulting in a drop of around 25 percent in the prices paid to US
farmers. This legislated reduction brought prices below costs, re-
sulting in export prices far below average costs of production.
The accompanying chart looks at the cost of production com-
pared to market prices and shows that US export dumping has
increased since the coming into force of the WTO.
Much of the agribusiness sector has been consolidated into
literally a handful of global monopolies or near monopolies since
the signing of the Uruguay Round agreements in April 1994.
While it is not yet possible to fully assess the wide spectrum of
35. See Crop Production and Market Data, 62 DOANE'S AGRIC. REPORTS 19-
5 (1999).
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US AGRICULTURAL EXPORT DUMPING MONITOR
1994 - 1997
Cost of Full COP
Production Including Export Export
(COP) "GATT7- Dumping Dumping
Excluding Recognized" Average as a as a
Gov't Gov't Export Percent Percent of
Crop Year Subsidies' Subsidies2  Price' of COP4  Full COP
Corn
($/bu) 1994 2.25 2.74 [21.8]
1995 3.14 3.96 3.41 [8.6] 13.9
1996 4.45 6.61 [48.5]
1997* 2.29 3.28 [4.3]
Cotton
($/lb) 1994 0.86 0.89 (3.5)
1995 1.57 1.98 1.46 7.0 26.3
1996 1.11 1.01 9.0
1997* 0.96 0.81 15.63
Rice
($Icwt) 1994 9.08 17.55 [93.3]
1995 10.77 10.92 15.89 [47.541 [45.5]
1996 13.25 23.53 [77.601
1997* 14.08 26.40 [87.5]
Soybeans
($Ibu) 1994 5.61 6.91 [23.2]
1995 6.39 n/a 6.64 [3.9] nla
1996 8.06 10.08 [25.1]
1997* 8.31 10.40 [25.2]
Wheat
($Ibu) 1994 4.85 4.29 11.5
1995 6.32 8.27 5.72 9.5 30.8
1996 8.11 7.69 5.2
1997* 5.81 5.08 12.6
* Adjusted using projected Producer Price Index (PPI) numbers.
1 Cost of production (COP) data includes fixed and variable cash expenses and economic
ownership costs. The COP data does not include government-paid costs of production, such
as those measured by the Aggregate Measure of Support (AMS) under the Uruguay Round
of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). COP data iscompiled by the US
Department of Agriculture Economic Research Service (USDA ERS). Data was adjusted
for inflation (constant dollar terms) using the PPI for individual commodities (1982=base
period, with the exception of rice which uses 1991 as the base period) as calculated by the
US Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS).
2 Full COP includes the GATT UR Aggregate Measure of Support (AMS) per unit as
calculated by the USDA ERS. AMS figures reflect the government-paid costs for market
price support, direct income supports, input cost subsidies. It does not include the cost of
other government services such as research, inspection services, environmental programs,
export marketing programs or tax benefits. AMS figures available for 1995 only.
3 Export prices for wheat, corn and soybeans reflect f.o.b. at the Gulf-of-Mexico ports. Cotton
export prices reflect a seven-market f.o.b. average spot price. Rice prices represent f.o.b.
Houston market prices. All export prices compiled by the USDA ERS. Agricultural
Outlook series. Table 24. All export prices reflect commercial shipments as well as
commodities shipped and sold through US food aid, export subsidy and marketing
programs. Export prices adjusted for inflation (constant dollar terms) using the PPI for
individual commodities (1982=base period, with the exception of rice which uses 1991 as
the base period) as calculated by the US BLS.
Percent of Export Dumping (PED) calculated by subtracting COP from the Export Price
and dividing by the COP for each commodity. Bracketed numbers [ I indicate that no
dumping has occurred, that is, exports are sold at a price above the US domestic costs of
production.
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impacts of this degree of monopolistic control, it is evident that
higher prices are being charged to farmers for inputs and lower
prices paid to them for their production. 36 While concern about
monopolistic behavior is growing among producers in the US,
the Clinton Administration has steadfastly refused to allow any
discussion of anti-trust disciplines at the WTO. Perhaps the
most obfuscatory but telling statement reflecting this refusal
was made by Joel Klein, Assistant Attorney General for the An-
titrust Division of the Justice Department, in a June 30' speech
to an Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development
conference on trade and competition: "[T]he relationship be-
tween international trade and international antitrust is so im-
portant, so complete, and so rapidly evolving that no one
institution or series of bilateral or multilateral arrangements
should be permitted to monopolize it."37
The third element of the new trade rules that have contrib-
uted to export dumping are the provisions that essentially legiti-
mized, for the very first time in history, the paying of export
subsidies for grain and other farm commodities. GATT rules
against dumping had prohibited the sale of goods at prices below
the cost of production, including a return on investment and the
cost of marketing: "The contracting parties recognize that dump-
ing by which products of one country are introduced into the
commerce of another country at less than the normal value of
the products, is to be condemned if it causes or threatens mate-
rial injury to an established industry."38 However, under the
new WTO rules, export subsidies are explicitly permitted and
they are transferable between and among different crops and
producers at the discretion of governments. 39 Under these rules,
the US government can now move export subsidies from one
crop to the next and be completely legal under the WTO. This
means that when certain U.S. internal prices are so low they do
not need export subsidies to out-compete the production of other
countries, the situation of U.S. corn and soybeans at the mo-
ment, export subsidies formerly used for those crops can be
transferred to other crops to help finance their dumping.
36. See William Heffernan, Consolidation in the Food and Agriculture Sys-
tem: Report to the National Farmers Union (1999).
37. Joel Klein, "A Reality Check on Antitrust Rules in the World Trade
Organization, and a Practical Way Forward on International Antitrust," Speech
to the Organization for Economic Cooperation in Europe (June 30, 1999).
38. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, art. VI.1.
39. See Agreement on Agriculture, arts. 8, 9, 10, 11.
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III. IMPACT OF WTO-ENCOURAGED EXPORT DUMPING
ON ECONOMICALLY AND ECOLOGICALLY
SUSTAINABLE AGRICULTURE
Each of these three dumping policies - lowering of farm
prices, encouraging monopoly, and the legitimizing of export
subsidies - have had negative impacts on efforts to move US
farming practices toward financial and ecological sustainability.
For the purposes of this paper, we define sustainable agriculture
by four broadly accepted elements: (1) prices which cover the full
cost of production, including environmental costs and fair in-
come; (2) reduced dependence on chemical fertilizers and pesti-
cides; (3) reduction of externalized ecological impacts through
pollution prevention and cost internalization; and (4) greater re-
liance on the use of ecologically modern farming practices such
as integrated pest management (IPM), crop rotations, no-till and
reduced tillage systems, and other practices that reduce soil loss
and contamination, cut air and water pollution, and avoid losses
in habitat and biodiversity.
The farm crisis we face today speaks for itself in terms of
economic sustainability. The price levels and support cuts facili-
tated by the WTO agreement have put most US farmers at risk
of bankruptcy. A few statistics on the current crisis will provide
some context. While it is not accurate to directly tie all aspects of
the current crisis to the Uruguay Round Agreements, there are
strong indications of its major role, especially in the lowering of
farm prices. Since the signing of the Uruguay Round Agree-
ments, wheat prices are down 42 percent and corn prices are
down 38 percent. 40 In almost all regions of the North America,
net farm income is down dramatically. In Illinois, Farm Busi-
ness Management Association records in 1998 showed a drop to
$11,074 average farm income compared to the recent five-year
average of $31,000. 4 1 In the Red River Valley of North Dakota
and Minnesota farm income fell to $20,600 in 1998 compared to
$37,000 in 1997.42 On Prince Edward Island, in Canada, farm
income is down to $7.5 million after averaging $43 million be-
tween 1990 and 1996. 43
As farm prices fall, many producers respond by attempting
to increase their yields. Some do this by plowing up more land.
40. Price figures are from Ian Elliot, supra note 21.
41. See Dan Miller, Illinois, PROGRESSIVE FARMER, July 1999, at 18.
42. See Dan Miller, North Dakota, PROGRESSIVE FARMER, July 1999, at 19.
43. See NFU Presents Brief on Farm Income Crisis, UNION FARMER
MONTHLY, May 1999, at 7.
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Others do it by applying ever greater quantities of fertilizer and
other chemicals. This intensification strategy is often harmful to
the environment. Even the WTO itself has begun to acknowl-
edge the negative ecological consequences of falling farm prices.
A recent report of the official WTO Committee on Trade and En-
vironment (CTE)44 cited studies 45 acknowledging that farm
price cuts in the North (US, Europe, etc.) can result in an in-
crease in the intensity of their chemical use and other inputs.
These studies show that because most farmers are in debt, and
therefore need to maintain their cashflow, they increase produc-
tion through either intensification (more fertilizer and pesti-
cides) or extensification (plowing up new lands). Both of these
responses are environmentally damaging, and both have been
seen in the United States since prices began to fall after the
WTO-framed "Freedom to Farm" bill of 1996. The most thorough
analysis of the environmental impacts of agricultural trade lib-
eralization, conducted by the North American Free Trade Agree-
ment (NAFTA) Commission for Environmental Cooperation,
includes a case study of corn (maize) that concludes that "the
differential pace and degree of reduction and elimination of tar-
iffs and other trade barriers under NAFTA can have major im-
pacts on production and consumption substitution in ways that
are not optimal for economic efficiency or environmental
enhancement."46
The WTO rules have created a disincentive for ecological
cost internalization at both the farm level and at the national
level. Some approaches to more sustainable agriculture produc-
44. WTO Committee on Trade and Environment, Environmental Benefits
of Removing Trade Restrictions and Distortions: Note by the Secretariat, WT/
CTE/W/67 (Nov. 7, 1997).
45. See, e.g., K. Anderson and R. Tyers, DisARRAY IN WORLD FOOD MAR-
KETS: A QUANTITATIVE ASSESSMENT (1992).
46. For a fully developed analysis of all of the impacts of trade liberaliza-
tion on all aspects of sustainable agriculture, see Commission for Environmen-
tal Cooperation, Assessing Environmental Affects of the North American Free
Trade Agreement (NAFTA): An Analytic Framework (Phase II) and Issues Stud-
ies (1999). This study by the NAFTA Commission for Environmental Coopera-
tion traced four aspects of agriculture that affect the environment - production,
management and technology; physical infrastructure; social organization; and
government policy - and evaluated their respective impacts on the air, water,
land and biodiversity. The analysis was concentrated on North America, but the
conclusions about the inter-relationships between changes in trade policies, im-
pacts on farm prices, and eventual environmental impacts are largely applica-
ble to an analysis of similar issues with the WTO. The CEC looked more closely
at two specific sectors - the production of corn (maize) in Mexico, and beef feed-
lots in the U.S. and Canada.
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tion do not involve great increases in costs, but some do - with
economic implications for farmers. For example, the United Na-
tions Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) has found that
for soya and other oil crops the internalization of environmental
costs would result in the long term in "marked increases of pro-
duction costs of the major producers and exporters and affect
their relative competitiveness and international market
shares."47 Another example is the cost internalization mecha-
nism called the "polluter pays principle."48 Adding additional
taxes to the cost of fertilizer or pesticides to help cover some of
the costs of clean-up are facing stiff resistance as prices paid to
farmers are being lowered by the trade regime. There have been
some proposals to implement countervailing duties to offset ex-
ternalized environmental costs4 9 but such duties are likely to be
condemned as barriers to trade.
WTO-led cuts in farm prices have put organic and other sus-
tainable farmers at greater economic risk. Although the organic
market in the U.S. and Europe has been growing by 10-20 per-
cent annually,50 many organic producers are finding that cur-
rent market prices are so low they are unable to get premium
prices high enough to continue their organic production. For ex-
ample, in 1994, the year that the AoA was signed, prices re-
ceived by Minnesota soybean growers using organic methods
was over $21 dollars per bushel. This has declined to only $8.00
per bushel this year, with predictions of lower prices next year.51
IV. IMPACT OF EXPORT DUMPING ON THE HUMAN
RIGHT TO FOOD SECURITY
Ensuring an adequate, safe, and affordable food supply is
perhaps the oldest and most basic role of government. Through-
out human history, local, regional and national governments
have ensured a steady supply of basic foods by taking steps to
eliminate or counteract supply (and therefore price) fluctuations
47. Possible Impacts of Environmental Regulations on the Cultivation,
Processing and Trade in the Two Major Annual and Perennial Oil Crops, FAO,
CCP:OF97/2 (1997).
48. See Recommendation on Guiding Principles Concerning Environmental
Policies, OECD (May 26, 1972); Rio Declaration on Environment and Develop-
ment, UNCED, A/CONF.151/26 (August 12, 1992).
49. See Thomas K. Plopchan, Jr., Recognition and Countervailing Environ-
mental Subsidies, 26 INT'L LAW. 763 (1992).
50. See Organic: Growing into the 21" Century, Organic Farm Research
Foundation, Santa Cruz, Cal. (1999).
51. Interviews with staff at the Organic Growers and Buyers Association,
New Brighton, MN (May 1999).
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related to unpredictable factors such as the weather, disease,
pests, and technology. The United Nations "Universal Declara-
tion of Human Rights" declared the right to food and to feed one-
self as a central obligation of government along with protecting
freedom of religion and the right to be free from torture. Over
the years, governments have developed a broad range of policy
tools, such as inventory management schemes, quantitative con-
trols on import and export controls, cost-of-production price sup-
ports, and government-held emergency food reserves to keep
supply balanced with demand in order to keep prices within ac-
ceptable ranges - for both farmers and consumers. 52
The AoA, however, included a large number of provisions
specifically designed to limit the type and magnitude of govern-
ment interventions allowed in the pursuit of stable prices for
farmers and consumers. The resulting price volatility has been
especially hard on poor countries, increasing the social and eco-
nomic burden5 3 of their governments and adding to their costs
for food imports.5 4 Perhaps the most important rules of the AoA
in this regard were those that tended to increase export dump-
ing and those that placed limits on the ability of individual coun-
tries to protect themselves from this dumping or other price
destabilization actions. Many Third World countries that rely on
commodity exports for their foreign earnings have seen this in-
come drop, reducing their pool of hard currency. Since the new
Uruguay Round agreement severely limits governments' ability
to control imports and exports through quantitative restrictions
or tariffs, there is very little they can do except borrow more
money or go without crucial imports, such as medicine or basic
foods.
With new WTO rules limiting the ability of countries to con-
trol imports, local farmers are seeing the prices they receive fall
to the lower world levels. This either bankrupts them, thus put-
ting them out of farming and perhaps at hunger's door, or it
means that they do not have any profit that they can use to re-
52. See Alexander Sarris, Price and Income Variability, Workshop on
Emerging Trade Issues in Agriculture, OECD (1998).
53. See The Food Situation in the Least Developed and Net Food Importing
Developing Countries, FAO paper presented to the WTO Committee on Agricul-
ture (November 20-21, 1997).
54. See Panos Konandreas, Jim Greenfield and Ramesh Sharma, The Con-
tinuation of the Reform Process in Agriculture: Developing Countries' Perspec-
tives, paper presented to seminar on Latin America and the Caribbean in Face
of the Furthering Process of Multilateral Agricultural Reforms (Nov. 23-24,
1998).
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invest for improving yields. In both cases, the right to food is
being violated in both the short term and the long-term. Many
of the more severely affected countries in the WTO, primarily
members of the Least Developed Countries (LDC) group and the
Net Food-Importing Developing Countries (NFIDC) group, have
been calling on the international agencies to address the
problems being created by the Uruguay Round. Analysis by the
FAO since 1995 suggests that for all low-income food deficit
countries, their food import bill will indeed-be $9.8 billion higher
in the year 2000 than at the start of the Uruguay Round negoti-
ations, of which $3.6 billion - a 14 percent increase - would be
directly attributable to the Uruguay Round results. 55 The Inter-
national Monetary Fund (IMF) disputed the FAO findings, how-
ever, on grounds it overstated the degree of liberalization likely
to occur from 1995-2000 and subsequently overstated the likely
price changes. The IMF claimed the 1996 "food price spikes"
were "unrelated to the Round" and that "declining stocks [pre-
dicted as an outcome of the Round] do not necessarily imply pro-
portional declines in food aid."5 6 With this disagreement over
price projections and their direct causes in hand, the WTO Com-
mittee on Agriculture decided in 1996 not to trigger the "Mar-
rakesh Decision,"57 which committed developed countries to
provide compensation to low income food deficit countries if they
are adversely affected by higher food prices as a result the
AoA.5 8
In an attempt to address this conflicting documentation on
Uruguay Round specific food security impacts, the South Centre,
an intergovernmental agency in Geneva that serves as a think-
tank for its developing country members, has prepared a 27-
point "Checklist to Assist the Preparation of Country Exper-
iences on the Impacts of the WTO Agreement on Agriculture"
that gives some indication of the kinds of impacts they believe
the WTO is having on their food supply and security.59
55. See The State of Food and Agriculture: Agricultural Trade, Entering a
New Era?, FAO Agriucultural Series No. 28, ISSN 0081-4539 (1995).
56. International Monetary Fund Working Paper, The Uruguay Round and
Net Food Importers (1995).
57. Marrakesh Decision on Measures Concerning the Possible Negative Ef-
fects of the Reform Programme on Least-Developed and Net Food-Importing
Developing Countries, see supra, note 4.
58. See Penny Fowler, The Marrakesh Decision: Honouring the Commit-
ment to Net Food-Importing Developing Countries, Catholic Institute for Inter-
national Research Briefing (Sept. 1996).
59. South Centre, Checklist to Assist the Preparation of Country Exper-
iences on the Impacts of the WTO Agreement on Agriculture: Food Security,
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BOXI: ELEMENTS OF THE "CHECKLIST TO ASSIST THE
PREPARATION OF COUNTRY EXPERIENCES ON THE
IMPACTS OF THE WTO AGREEMENT ON AGRICULTURE"
PREPARED BY THE SOUTH CENTRE, GENEVA
[EXCERPTED]
1. What are the major agricultural exports? Identify new exports, if
any, in the post Uruguay Round period.
2. Which are the major markets for major agricultural exports?
Identify new markets, if any.
3. What is the share of agricultural exports in the total country
exports? Identify any increase or decrease, if any, in the post Uruguay
Round period.
4. What are the major agricultural exports that benefit from any
preferential market access in the developed markets? Identify any
increase or decrease in the volume of such exports.
5. What are the major agricultural exports that are subject to tariff
rate quotas? What have been the rates of utilization of these tariff
rate quotas?
V. USING THE WTO AGRICULTURE TALKS TO
PROMOTE ECONOMICALLY AND ECOLOGICALLY
SUSTAINABLE AGRICULTURE
The key components of sustainable agriculture - adequate
income, reduced dependency on chemicals, cost internalization,
and movement towards ecologically modern practices - are es-
sential to the achievement of what is called "multifunctional ag-
riculture." This concept recognizes that farmers provide many
products and services to the whole society, beyond food and fi-
ber. These functions include the maintenance of healthy land
and clean water, soil fertility and genetic diversification, habitat
preservation, carbon sequestration, flood control, employment,
open space, beautiful vistas, recreation, renewal opportunities,
and protected greenbelts and wildlife.
Sometimes referred to as "public goods," these positive non-
commercial services supplied by agriculture are rarely valued in
the marketplace. Even the use of economic instruments to cor-
rect market failures towards sustainable development has tradi-
tionally focused on the negatives. For example, eco-taxation
Farmers and a Fair Place for the South, Institute for Agriculture and Trade
Policy, Foundation Charles Leopold Mayer pour le Progrds de 'Homme, So-
lagral (Sept. 30 - Oct. 4, 1998).
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1. What are the major food imports? What are the major sources of
these imports?
2. What is the share of food imports in total imports? Identify any
increase or decrease in the share in the post Uruguay Round period.
3. What is the value of food imports as a percentage of total export
earnings? Identify any increase or decrease.
4. What is the share of food aid in the total food imports? Identify
any increase or decrease.
5. What is the share of domestic food production in the total
domestic food requirements? Identify any increase or decrease.
6. What has been the trend of staple food prices in the domestic
market?
General
1. What is the total area under cultivation? Identify any increase or
decrease in the post Uruguay Round period.
2. What are the areas under cultivation of food and export crops
respectively? Identify any changes.
3. What is the share of the total labor force employed in the
agricultural sector?
4. What is the rate of rural unemployment? Has it increased in the
post Uruguay Round period?
5. What is the percentage of population living in rural areas?
Identify any increase or decrease.
6. What is the size of the average farm? Has it increased? It will also
be helpful to include the experience of small/subsistence farmers.
Excerpted from the Annex of the Proceedings of the Washington DC Meeting
on the WTO Agreement on Agriculture: Food Security, Farmers and a Fair
Place for the South, organized by the Institute for Agriculture and Trade
Policy, Fondation Charles Leopold Mayer pour le Progres de L'Homme and
Solagral, 30 September - 4 October, 1998.
along the lines of the "polluter pays principle" (PPP) has been
proposed to bring pesticide prices up to their "real" level60 or to
reduce nutrient surpluses. 6 ' Production of positive externalities,
it is argued, should be rewarded according to a mirror of the
PPP; some suggest this approach be called the "provider gets
60. See David Pearce and Robert Tinch, The True Price Of Pesticides, in
BUGS IN THE SYSTEM: REDESIGNING THE PESTICIDE INDUSTRY FOR SUSTAINABLE
AGRIcULTURE 50-93 (William Vorley and Kenney eds., 1998).
61. See Ministry of Agriculture, Nature Management and Fisheries, The
Netherlands, Policy Documenbt on Manure and Ammonia, <http'/
www.minlnv.nl/international/policy/environ/>.
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principle" (PGP)62 or, perhaps, the "stewardship is rewarded
principle" (SRP) or the "pay for provision of public goods princi-
ple" (PPG). And a wide range of economic and policy instru-
ments are available to reward the producers of multifunctional
agriculture. These include subsidies, grants, tax concessions,
technical assistance and improved access to markets through,
for example, government procurement 63 - all of which can be
applied at any level of government, including the local level. 6 4
We believe that the application of basic economic and eco-
logical criteria to new systems of multifunctional agriculture is
the best way to re-create sustainable farming systems and rural
communities. To accomplish this, we believe that the following
changes need to be made to current WTO rules to support, in-
stead of harm, economic and ecologically sustainable agricul-
ture. Sustainable agriculture needs to be supported by WTO
rules that include the following: (1) Phasing out export dumping;
(2) Banning of export subsidies; (3) Global anti-trust measures
that address a wide-range of anti-competitive business prac-
tices; (4) Support for government assistance to farmers making
the transition to more sustainable farming practices; (5) Support
for the development of multifunctional agriculture, including
policies for rewarding farmers for provision of green services to
society that are transborder or global in nature; (6) Consumer
labeling and government procurement practices to encourage
sustainable agriculture; (7) Mechanisms for tariff and non-tariff
measure adjustments in response to currency fluctuations; and
(8) Protection of national and regional supply and demand bal-
ancing mechanisms, including the use of quantitative import
and export regulations and domestic supply management
programs.
VI. USING THE WTO AGRICULTURAL TALKS TO
PROMOTE THE HUMAN RIGHT TO FOOD SECURITY
The United Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights
is fairly clear in its declaration of the centrality of food security
as a fundamental human right. Article 25.1 states that "Every-
62. See Environmental Effects of Trade Liberalization in the Agricultural
Sector, Submission by Norway to the WTO Committee on Trade and Environ-
ment, WT/CTE/W/100 (Jan. 8, 1999).
63. See Robert J.P. Gale and Stephan R. Barg, The Greening Of Budgets:
The Choice Of Governing Instrument, in GREEN BUDGET REFORM 1-27 (Robert
J.P. Gale, Stephan R. Barg, and Sandy Gillies eds., 1995).
64. van Broekhuizen R, L. Klep, H. Oostindie and J.D. van der Ploeg, RE-
NEWING THE COUNTRYSIDE (1997) (in author's possession).
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one has the right to a standard of living adequate for the health
and well-being of himself and of his family, including food."
There is a growing concern among human rights leaders and ac-
tivists around the planet about the growing number of human
rights violations that may be directly attributable to the actions
of global institutions, such as the World Bank, the IMF and the
WTO. Over the past few years, NGOs from all over the world
have been meeting to discuss the threats to food security posed
by the current world trading system and to develop specific pro-
posals for changes in WTO rules that would help move the world
trading system in ways that would tend to support instead of
discourage food security.65 A consensus seems to be forming
around a package of seven major reforms.
First, we need specific language in the WTO protecting the
right of nations to take action to protect the most vulnerable
people in their societies in times of economic crisis. For example,
India has proposed that developing countries be allowed, under
the AoA Article 20 on "Non-Trade Concerns," to implement agri-
cultural and other policies to pursue food security objectives
without facing AoA sanctions.66 Other "non-trade concerns,"
such as the relationship of agriculture to culture - in terms of
cosmologies, rites of passage, social celebrations, family and
community institutions, traditional clothing and cuisine, and in-
numerable other social norms - are also of significance. The use
of government intervention to protect food security and cultural
traditions should be respected by the WTO.
Second, the WTO should encourage countries to take meas-
ures to encourage domestic food production for domestic food
consumption. The current WTO rules are based on the idea that
nations will be better off if they "import their food security."
This kind of ideological approach has been a disaster for many
65. For historical background of the problem of implementing food security
as a human right, see Orin Kirshner, Human Rights Lost: A (Very) Short His-
tory of the Post-World War 11 Global Food and Agriculture Policy Regime, Insti-
tute for Agriculture and Trade Policy (May 15, 1996). For a review of NGO
activities in food security as a human right, see Needs vs. Rights and the Right
to Food <http://www.iatp.org/iatpHR50>. For discussion of the AoA and its im-
pacts on food security, see International Workshop on WTO Agreement on Agri-
culture, Research and Information System for the Non-Aligned and Other
Developing Countries, Institute for Agriculture and Trade Policy and ActionAid
(1998); and see Washington, D.C., Meeting on the WTO Agreement on Agricul-
ture: Food Security, Farmers and a Fair Place for the South, Institute for Agri-
culture and Trade Policy and Foundation Charles Leopold Mayer pour le
Progres de l'Homme and Solagral (1998).
66. See Food Security: An Important Non-Trade Concern - An Informal Pa-
per by India, THimD WoRLD EcoNoMIcs, Feb. 1-15, 1999, at 15.
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nations and has led to severe criticism of the WTO by nearly
every development NGO and agency. WTO rules that make it a
violation of trade rules to use government intervention to sup-
port local farmers must be replaced by new rules that enable
countries to effectively address economic crisis facing family and
peasant farming, in both North and South countries.67 Some
WTO members have already begun making specific proposals
along these lines.
Third, current WTO provisions that have encouraged na-
tions to eliminate emergency food storage facilities and pro-
grams should be repealed. Stocks of food held near centers of
population in virtually every country are one of the most impor-
tant components of any successful food security scheme. The
elimination of many of these food reserves since the signing of
the Marrakesh Agreement has resulted in huge price fluctua-
tions and dangerously low levels of reserve food stocks on more
than one occasion. 68
Fourth, WTO rules should be changed to support greater di-
versity in food production systems. A key to food security is the
maintenance of regionally diverse agricultural systems, often
characterized by sustainable practices on a smaller scale. These
include the maintenance of biological diversity, such as the culti-
vation of land races and vigorous communities of insects and mi-
crobial life on a healthy diversified farm.6 9 Perhaps most
importantly, food security depends upon access to food within a
region, regardless of comparative advantage and market forces.
Fifth, there needs to be more done to ensure that the WTO
does not violate workers' rights to organize for collective bar-
gaining and to receive wages adequate to maintain a healthy
diet and standard of living. While half of the world's population
still lives on the land, the other half are in or near cities and
dependent on their earnings to buy food for their families. Em-
ployment and wages have fallen in many countries since the
signing of the WTO agreement, yet there has been no reaction
other than admonitions for "staying the course" and experi-
menting with even more radical economic de-regulation. WTO
67. See Japan to Stress Self-Sufficiency in Food at WTO Talks, PF TODAY,
June 17, 1999.
68. See Mark Ritchie and Karen Lehman, Food Shortages, Sustainable Ag-
riculture and Hunger: The Paradox of Higher World Market Prices for Grains,
Institute for Agriculture and Trade Policy (1996).
69. For a discussion of the significance of the relationship between ecosys-
tem health and biological diversity see Gretchen Daily, NATURE's SERVICES: SO-
CIETAL DEPENDENCE ON NATURAL EcosYsTEMs, (1997.)
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rules must accommodate other international guarantees of
workers' rights in order to help address the problems of food in-
security facing many in our cities.
Sixth, global rules must advance local, state, and national
efforts to prevent or break-up monopolies in the food and agri-
culture sectors. The end result of all monopolies is higher costs
and lower efficiency. Furthermore, great power can be wielded
by whomever controls the food supply. While food has often
been used as a weapon by corrupt political leaders, the control-
ling forces now are transnational corporations that in economic
terms are bigger than most nations.
Seventh, there is a call for the creation of a working group
or committee at the WTO on Trade and Food Security, along the
lines of the current Committee on Trade and Environment
(CTE). This is seen as the beginning of recognition by the WTO
that their actions affect food security and that they have a re-
sponsibility, as members of the United Nations family of global
institutions, to support the commitments to economic, social,
cultural, civil, and political human rights detailed in the Univer-
sal Declaration of Human Rights.
VII. POLITICAL CONTEXT OF THE UPCOMING WORLD
AGRICULTURAL TRADE NEGOTIATIONS
In 1986, when the Uruguay Round began, negotiators as-
sumed that their four year schedule of global trade talks would
be business as usual. Nobody outside the closed fraternity of
trade negotiators knew anything about the GATT, which meant
that negotiations could go forward as they had in the past -
without public input and without political oversight or approval
at the end. Since most of the talks were in secret, no documents
were released to the public.70 At least in the beginning, the
negotiators were correct in their assumption that there would be
very little questioning of their actions, motivations, or
judgments.
Alongside these institutional barriers of secrecy was an-
other factor that limited public participation or democratic as-
sessment. Almost no family farmer, peasant or any other citizen
organization on the planet had ever heard of the GATT, except
perhaps in passing, and none knew anything about the past ac-
tions, emerging debates, or the potential implications. Ignorant
70. See, e.g., Rosine Plank, An Unofficial Description of How a GATT Panel
Works and Does Not, 29 Swiss REVIEW OF INT'L COMPETITION L. 81 (1987).
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citizen groups were bliss as far as the GATT negotiators and bu-
reaucrats were concerned. Fortunately, public ignorance of the
Uruguay Round was to be short-lived. Four key developments
changed this political formula.
First, there was a revolution in global communications tech-
nology. The advent of faxes, email, the internet, and cheap over-
seas long distance calling greatly accelerated the spread of
information around the globe. Cross-border connections and col-
laborations in the 1970s and early 1980s, such as the Nestle
Boycott and the gatherings of the United Nations Conference on
Trade and Development (UNCTAD), which encouraged the en-
gagement of non-governmental organizations, laid the ground
work for citizen groups - both North and South - to communi-
cate, collaborate and share information on the new GATT round
at a level never before imagined. The concerns of the handful of
people that saw the importance of these talks could be easily,
cheaply, and widely communicated with activists, media, and
opinion-leaders all over the planet. With electronic communica-
tions, the "voices crying out in the wilderness" could be heard
around the planet. The daily news bulletin on the Uruguay
Round, published by the Institute for Agriculture and Trade Pol-
icy, eventually reached tens of thousands of subscribers. 71
Second, a new generation of global activists came of age.
Thanks to prior campaigns, there already existed a network of
sophisticated global thinkers, analysts, and activists. Most were
not previously familiar with the GATT or trade per se, but as
they tuned in electronically, they immediately understood the
pattern. These folks were already active in national and global
networks working on issues such as poverty, hunger, environ-
mental degradation, and human rights and, as they understood
the stakes, began to gather staff and resources with which to
begin campaigning on GATT. 72
Third, many GATT insiders failed to notice that the veil was
being lifted. Negotiators were accustomed to secrecy and negoti-
ating traditions outside the realm of normal democratic account-
ability - circumstances that were ripe for abuse. The kinds of
proposals made, especially by the Reagan Administration, 73
71. To consult these and other IATP bulletins, see <http'/Avww.newsbulle-
tin.org/>.
72. See Chakravarthi Raghavan, RECOLONIZATION: GATT, THE URUGUAY
ROUND AND THE THIRD WORLD (1990).
73. The Reagan Administration appointed a long-time executive of the Car-
gill company, one of the world's largest grain traders, to head the U.S. delega-
tion in the AoA talks. Members of the Multilateral Trade Negotiation Coalition
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were so radical and outrageous that it became easy to paint a
picture of the GATT as a monster (e.g. "GATTzilla") aimed at
destroying environmental laws, family farmers, poor people and
all that was good. Corporate greed generated a sharp backlash.
Fourth, GATT extended into the realm of domestic politics.
Many of the most extreme proposals had nothing to do with in-
ternational trade rules but were instead aimed at overturning
domestic laws and regulations via the secretive process of trade
negotiations. For example, the attempt (ultimately successful)
by Presidents Reagan, Bush, and Clinton to use the Uruguay
Round to overturn U.S. patent law engendered fierce opposition
from small inventors who saw this change as a threat to their
well-being. 74
As part of the arrogance that characterized these negotia-
tions, many of the key GATT negotiators embellished their
speeches to favorite constituency groups with boasts and
promises about what domestic laws they were going to get rid of
via the GATT. US Trade Representative Clayton Yeutter was
one of the most public and vocal, promising chemical industry
groups and others that he was using the Uruguay Round talks
to overturn US environmental and consumer protection laws
that he and President Reagan did not like. In an article purport-
ing to balance trade and environmental interests, Yeutter said
that "we need to 'Gatt' the greens, not green the Gatt."75
These four dynamics eventually led to the creation of a
global campaign of local and national groups that began to knit
together the information, analysis, and political strategy needed
to start bringing democratic review and input into the global
trade negotiations process. The Uruguay Round (along with the
debate over the NAFTA) turned out to be the turning point in
the development of an informed public debate about the institu-
tions of global economics and finance and about the dynamics of
global policymaking.
that advised the U.S. Trade Representative at that time included Cargill, Ral-
ston-Purina, ADM, General Mills, General Foods, Continental Grain, RJR
Nabisco and Con Agra. It is not surprising that the Uruguay Round results
meet the needs of those corporations to a great extent, rather than sustainable
agriculture or rural development in either the North or the South.
74. See W. John Moore, Reinventing Patents, NAT'L Focus, March 20, 1993,
at 694.
75. Clayton Yeutter, Gatting' the Greens - Environmentalists must live
with trade, FIN. TimEs, September 2, 1994, at 14. For more examples of this
tendency to use trade talks as a convenient and largely secretive way to over-
turn or undermine domestic laws and regulations, see Walter Russell Mead,
Bushism Found, HARPER'S MAG., February 1992.
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Since the end of the Uruguay Round, these networks have
continued to grow and to develop in knowledge, strength, and
experience. Many new groups have begun to follow trade issues
as they discover that the World Trade Organization, the new
name for the GATT, is making rules that affect some aspect of
their work. For example, many environmental organizations
that ignored the Uruguay Round have become very involved as
they have seen the WTO dispute settlement process resulting in
attacks on basic environmental programs. 76
The announcement by the White House that they planned
to bring the next Ministerial to the United States and to use it to
launch a new round of negotiations has touched off a flurry of
new organizing efforts and preparations. It is clear from the ini-
tial response to the idea of a new round of talks that things will
be very, very different this time. The following is a short list of
some of the new conditions that will influence the next round of
talks.
A. PUBLIC AwARENESS
During the Uruguay Round, the GATT was almost com-
pletely unknown. The World Trade Organization is, however,
relatively well known; many organizations are tracking its activ-
ities on a day to day basis. It is not yet as publicly recognized as
the IMF or World Bank, but it is no longer the world's best kept
secret. With the low cost of email, even the smallest organiza-
tions in the poorest countries have access to the latest WTO
news 24 hours a day, seven days a week.
B. ACCOUNTABILITY, ACCESS, AND PARTICIPATION
Many local, national and international groups working on
specific issues, such as hunger or human rights, now understand
.that there is a connection between their issue and trade. Many
see how trade, trade rules, and trade disputes affect their work,
and they are active on trade and WTO issues. During the last
76. See, e.g., World Trade Organization and the Environment: Technical
Statement by United States Environmental Organizations, addressed to Deputy
U.S. Trade Representative Susan G. Esserman and the Environmental Protec-
tion Agency's Acting Deputy Administrator Peter D. Robertson (July 16, 1999).
For more detailed discussion, see Daniel Esty, Greening the GATT: Trade, Envi-
ronment and the Future, Institute for International Economics (1994); and
Steve Charnovitz, Improving Environmental and Trade Governance, INT'L ENV.
AFF., Winter 1995.
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round the number of groups who saw the connections was very
small.
C. NGO-GOVERNMENT COOPERATION
There is a new collaboration among NGOs and some govern-
ments, especially in the countries of the South. During the last
round of talks, governments and NGOs did not see their mutual
interest, but this has changed. Today, many NGOs are con-
ducting training sessions for negotiators from the South, NGOs
are serving on advisory committees and delegations, and there is
a great deal of collaboration on the development of negotiating
goals and objectives.
D. TRANSPARENCY
In the Uruguay Round all documents were treated as state
secrets. Other than the negotiators, the only people who could
get their hands on even the most innocuous proposals and re-
ports were corporate officials who could afford the thousands of
dollars needed to subscribe to the exclusive "insider" newsletters
and bulletins. Documents are now more readily available and
many end up on the Internet or on the WTO web site. With the
aid of foreign language translation software, it is now possible to
make most documents available to most groups at no cost on a
timely basis. In the Uruguay Round it was a struggle to find out
what was going on and then to share this information. The dan-
ger in the next round of talks will be one of overload leading to
paralysis - as the flow reaches "drinking from a fire hose"
proportions.
E. NEW INSTITUTIONS, NETWORKS, AND COALITIONS
During the Uruguay Round there was no existing infra-
structure for monitoring the talks, sharing information, drawing
conclusions, setting objectives and priorities, or carrying out co-
ordinated efforts. This time around it will be very, very different.
For example, NGOs have a specific center in Geneva, the Inter-
national Centre for Trade and Sustainable Development,77 that
serves as an information source, liaison, and "temporary office"
for NGOs working on WTO issues. There are regular meetings
and conference calls among the most active groups on a global
77. International Centre for Trade and Sustainable Development. The
Centre's weekly trade news digest, BRIDGES, may be consulted at <http://
www.icstd.org>.
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basis, and many of constituency groups have developed a con-
sensus on their own specific objectives for the next round of
negotiations.
F. INFORMED MEDIA
In the past only a tiny number of reporters covered trade
and, for the most part, they were so close to the negotiators and
the GATT secretariat that they lacked basic objectivity. This
time around, all kinds of press - from food and lifestyle features
to science and environment journals to daily newspapers to the
major broadcast stations - are tuned into trade and the WTO.
The Seattle Ministerial Meeting of 1999 and subsequent negoti-
ations will be covered from a wide range of perspectives.
G. REALITY VS. COMPUTER PROJECTIONS
Much of the debate during the Uruguay Round centered on
computer projections made by governments and intergovern-
mental organizations, such as the World Bank. Their computers
claimed that "all ships will rise" under the terms of the final
agreement signed in Marrakesh, Morocco. It turns out that this
was not true. This time around, the debate will include an as-
sessment of what has already happened, the invalidity of the
prior, and therefore future, computer projections, and the need
to build in assessment, evaluation, and escape clauses in case
future government and intergovernmental organization predica-
tions continue to be unreliable.
H. SHIFT IN POWER
In the Uruguay Round, concerned groups could raise some
issues, but had virtually no impact on the outcome. As a result,
the rules of trade have few constraints or safety nets. At the
same time, a number of governments from Southern countries
expressed grave reservations about where the talks were headed
and the potential negative impact on their countries. In the end,
both the governments of the South and the NGOs have been
proven right - the Uruguay Round agreement has been bad for
the environment, consumers, and for food security in the South.
Critics have been largely vindicated. In the US, this reality has
led to a rethinking by many in Congress about the wisdom of
blindly following the lead of the President on trade matters, as
the 1998 defeat of "fast track" negotiating authority
demonstrated.
[Vol. 9:9
WTO & SusTAIrABLE AGRIcuLTuRE
We have reached a new stage in the debate where the con-
cerns of environmental, consumer, farm, labor, human rights
and other groups have come together to form a powerful lobby.
Many governments of the South are now providing the leader-
ship to challenge the old assumptions. This new bloc of South
country governments and NGOs from around the planet could
turn out to be the defining axis in the next talks.
I. NEW MODELS
In the past there were only a few models of successful global
campaigning, such as the Nestle boycott. Today, there is a wide
array of models for citizen action at the global level. The veter-
ans groups that forced governments to agree to a land mines
treaty that the veterans had formulated offers an inspired exam-
ple. Environmental groups have successfully influenced the im-
plementation of the Framework Convention on Climate Change
and peasant communities are working to ensure that the Con-
vention on Biological Diversity guarantees their rights to save
seeds. The defeat of the Multilateral Agreement on Investment
was a momentous victory for non-governmental activists world-
wide. This next round of WTO talks will have these victories and
models to draw upon.
J. POSITIVE ALTERNATIVES
During the last round of trade talks, citizens were largely
marginalized. In the intervening years we have gained enough
power to block a continuation of "business as usual," but this is
not enough. The crisis in the world economy, ranging from disas-
trously low farm and commodity prices to unstable currencies
and wild speculation caused by "hot money" investments, have
to be tackled at the global level as part of the next round of trade
talks. In addition to defending themselves from attack, like
those they suffered during the Uruguay Round, citizen groups
are beginning to prepare for using the next round to advance
positive ideas.
VIII. THE POLITICAL CHALLENGE AHEAD:
SAVING THE WTO
All three Bretton Woods Institutions - the International
Monetary Fund, the World Bank, and the World Trade Organi-
zation - are under fire both from the public-at-large and from
politicians. There are specific recent instances that contribute
to this political difficulty, such as the financial derivatives-gen-
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erated and IMF-mishandled Asian financial crisis;78 the ongoing
inability of the World Bank to effectively carry out its mission;79
and attacks on family farmers and environmental regulations by
the WTO. 80 Beyond these specifics is a fundamental critique of
the concepts and practices of neo-liberal economic theory and
their collective support for anything promoted as globalization.
At the end of the day, how the public comes to view these
institutions will reflect on much broader concepts, such as the
rule of law in international affairs. If the WTO continues to be
viewed as "captured" by a narrow group of corporate interests
and as promoting policies and practices bad for the environment,
working people, farmers, and consumers it will continue to un-
dermine general public support for the entire international sys-
tem that was built up after the Second World War.
From 1995-98, the Institute for Agriculture and Trade Pol-
icy organized a series of conferences on the 50th anniversaries of
the founding of the major post war global institutions, including
the UN, World Bank, IMF, WTO, FAO and the Universal Decla-
ration of Human Rights. These conferences featured the surviv-
ing founders of each institution and were held in the original
sites of the founding conferences. At the conference held on the
50th anniversary of the GATT, World Bank, and IMF there was
an urgency expressed by many of the 30 founders and early lead-
ers gathered. They were well aware of fading pubic support and
growing political hostility to these institutions and quite frank
in their assessments of the problems with the institutions at
present and the needs for reform.81
A theme that was repeated over and over was the need for
the institutions to shift from defending the interests of a few fa-
vored industries or companies towards supporting the broad
78. For perspective on the Asian financial crisis, see The Crisis in Context:
An Interview with Dr. Michael Chossudovsky, THE BIG PICTURE (Feb. 1999), at
1; Chakravarthi Raghavan, Asian crisis a major market failure, says UNCTAD,
SOUTH NORTH DEV. MONITOR (Feb. 2, 1998); and Walden Bello, The End of a
"Miracle:" Speculation, Foreign Capital Dependence and the Collapse of the
Southeast Asian Economies, MULTINATIONAL MONITOR, January-February 1998,
at 10-16.
79. See Bruce Rich, The Smile on the Child's Face: 1998 Epilogue to Mort-
gaging the Earth (1998).
80. See Steve Charnovitz, Addressing Environment and Labor in the WTO,
remarks presented at the Conference on "The Next Trade Negotiating Round:
Examining the Agenda for Seattle," (July 22, 1999); and Letter and Technical
Statement from U.S. Environmental Organizations, supra note 77.
81. For a selection of papers about the 1948 Bretton Woods conference and
the GATT's founders and early leaders, see THE BRETTON WOODs-GATT Sys-
TEM: RETROSPECT AND PROSPECT AFTER FIFTY YEARS (Orin Kirshner ed., 1996).
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aims and aspirations of society. In regards to the World Trade
Organization, this advice seems precisely on target. A growing
percentage of the public wants government agencies-at all
levels-to be more responsive to the needs of the individuals and
of the planet. Global institutions such as the WTO are no longer
insulated or isolated as they were in the past. Their actions will
be judged by their affect on the real world, not by computer pro-
jection of rosy futures or fidelity to any one particular economic
theory or ideology.
The main issues explored in this article, sustainable agri-
culture and food security, are only two in a whole sea of concerns
that people will be using to judge the WTO by in the future. In
the next set of talks, WTO negotiators could resolve many of the
problems created by the Uruguay Round. If they do so, it would
help restore the public trust that has been squandered by this
institution. For those of us who believe passionately in the need
for global cooperation and in the rule of law in international af-
fairs, it is crucial that we help move the WTO and other global
institutions away from defending a few special interests, and in
the direction of actively supporting the values and concerns of
the vast majority of the public in every country of the world.
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